Making correct investment decisions poses an important challenge for senior management. In particular, capital investments and consequently the appraisal of potential projects significantly affect a company's long-term performance and survival. The optimal decision, i.e. choosing the most profitable investment project, requires a non-distorted decision process with accurate data and rational decision-making. This paper revisits the phenomenon that "a hurdle rate in excess of the corporate cost of capital is often used to appraise divisional project proposals" (Harris, 2000, p. 91), and aims to provide a novel explanation based on managerial cognitive behaviour and corporate post-audit feedback processes. Götze et al. (2015) model the ideal investment decision process and identify seven typical stages, of which Stages 5 and 7 of Figure 1 are particularly relevant to this study. Stage 5 refers to the investment appraisal methods applied and the acceptance decision made; Stage 7 refers to the monitoring and 'post audit' of projects and the resulting feedback and learning process. The setting of hurdle rate and the potential systematic error, as argued later in this paper, affect both stages.
However, in practice there are problems in objectively determining an appropriate project-specific hurdle rate (see, for example, Titman and Martin, 2010) . Moreover, conducting project-specific risk adjustments is questioned by corporate finance literature. For example, Reimann (1990) suggests establishing a regularly updated cost of capital based on CAPM principle, applied as a common hurdle rate. Risk adjustments should be made at the cash flow level. Risk adjustments can be made in various ways. This is not picked up in this paper; for empirical findings about different approaches applied see for example Lindblom et al. (2010) .
A higher than optimal hurdle rate reduces profitability and implies a bias against lower-risk projects relative to riskier projects (Titman and Martin, 2010) . It can also lead to a shorttermism; companies may systematically favour projects with relatively high cash inflows in the close future by more strongly discounting cash flows that occur at a later point in time (Dobbs, 2009 ).
Existing explanations for the Hurdle Rate Premium
The Hurdle Rate Premium (HRP) has been known for many years and various explanations have been put forward. Brunzell et al. (2013) empirically find that the sophistication of a company's investment appraisal method is inversely related to the hurdle rate premium (the more sophisticated the method, the lower the hurdle rate). Additionally, they find that short-term pressure felt by decision-makers has a positive impact on the hurdle rate (Brunzell et al., 2013) . Meier and Tarhan (2007) suggest that the growth potential and financial situation of a company are positively associated with the hurdle rate premium. However, these are merely statistical observations, and do not provide logical explanations for the paradox.
Titman and Martin (2010) note the potential scenario of capital rationing with mutually exclusive projects in which the hurdle rate might be raised to equal the opportunity cost, i.e. the rate of return of the next-best project, but this interesting concept does not provide a generic explanation for the HRP.
A relatively high hurdle rate might also be chosen to compensate for managerial overconfidence and overoptimism, which typically lead to inflated cash flow projections (see for example Gervais, 2010; Dobbs, 2009) . This explanation could be valid where different level managers are involved in generating proposals from those making the investment decisions, since the higher level might want to adjust for biased behaviour below. However, instead of increasing the hurdle rate to correct for overconfidence and overoptimism, it would be more straightforward for the decision-maker to reduce the projected cash inflows across the project term; this would also avoid unintended compounding of the correction beyond the planning horizon.
Studies finding a hurdle rate premium (Meier and Tarhan, 2007; Poterba and Summers, 1995; Brunzell et al., 2013) compare the (theoretically required) cost of capital to the hurdle rate self-reported by companies. There is, however, no argument in the HRP literature that the premium is only attributable to a conscious (upwards) adjustment of the cost of capital to derive a hurdle rate -the premium may also be applied without much thought or awareness.
The adjustment of hurdle rates due to the explanations above mostly require conscious adjustment, they may not fully solve the puzzle. In the following section we argue that the premium may arise due to unconscious intuitive judgements and cognitive biases; that is, it may be caused by decision-makers using simplified decision rules, so-called heuristics, to facilitate decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974 , Kahneman, 2003 , Dobbs, 2009 ). This would imply, though none of the approaches outlined above has extensively dealt with this aspect, that distorted judgement may be an explanation. The hurdle rate premium could, at least partly, be attributed to limited (bounded) rational behaviour in that cognitive reasoning systematically and unconsciously guides decision-makers to make suboptimal decisions.
The relevance of cognitive biases to explain the Hurdle Rate Premium
Despite normative views that the optimal hurdle rate for appraising projects should equal the cost of capital, empirical surveys of practice do not confirm this. The arguments outlined in 1.3 above may provide partial explanations for the HRP but we maintain it has another explanation, based on decision-makers' bounded rationality and biased intuitive judgements.
Intuition may be involved whenever judgements are incorporated in the decision process thereby influencing the decision: When a manager determines the discount rate or hurdle rate for evaluating an investment project, he or she may subjectively use different sources of information including his or her 4 own experience, thereby deviating from the 'optimal' process.
The optimal process or outcome may be disputed but the tendency to set hurdle rates higher than can be explained by standard corporate finance theory, has been shown.
As indicated above, a decision-maker's memory, knowledge and experience almost always play a role in the process of searching and selecting the information from accounting records and knowledge (Luft and Shields, 2010) . This may vary between a fairly objective, 'close to optimal' choice of the hurdle rate where only few or no pieces of information are subjectively searched and selected on the one hand, and a highly subjective choice of the hurdle rate on the other hand. Even the 'close to optimal' case implies some subjective considerations.
The heuristics and biases concept − some background
From psychology-based research it is known that in decision situations under uncertainty, decision-makers often use 'heuristics' or 'heuristic principles' when their complex task is to make a judgement (and eventually make a decision) where a probability or value has to be estimated or predicted (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) . Heuristics are often described as decision shortcuts, rules of thumb or simple decision rules. Generally, a decision-maker -deliberately or (more typically) unconsciously 5 -simplifies the problem (i.e. uses simpler judgemental operations) in order to solve it. This can be due to various reasons such as limited information, time constraints and bounded cognitive capacity to store, retrieve and process information. As a consequence, the decision-maker forfeits an optimal result, which otherwiseif at all -might only be reached by a thorough and rational analysis, and accepts a satisfying and sufficing non-optimal decision instead. This bounded-rational behaviour is known as 'satisficing ' (Simon, 1955) .
To arrive at a judgement about an event that the decision-maker has limited information about, and that is not available to perception, the heuristic serves to search and choose the informational sources and information to utilise (Hastie and Dawes, 2010). Brunswik's Lens
Model provides a framework for judgement (Brunswik, 1952; Cooksey, 2001) . The hurdle rate is the to-be-judged criterion for which a judgement, i.e. an estimate, has to be made. The decision-maker uses the cues (the 'lens' that connects the environment with internal psychological processes) that are available to him or her such as information in accounting records, knowledge about how hurdle rates should be set and also from memory and wider experience (Luft and Shields, 2010) . Cues may be unconscious, interrelated and interdependent and involve 'limited ecological validity' due to uncertainty in the environment and limited time (Brunswik, 1952; Hastie and Dawes, 2010 ). The decision-maker then processes the cues' information and makes an inference as to what the criterion should be, i.e. he makes an estimate of the criterion (the hurdle rate) and thus arrives at a judgement (Hastie and Dawes, 2010).
Heuristics can be described as the way cues are combined and processed.
Generally, heuristics can be very helpful tools; intuitive thinking is not wrong in general but deemed to be skilled and successful (Kahneman, 2003) . Heuristics save time and simplify a problem and may lead to generally good judgements (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009 ), unlessconsciously or unconsciously -a cognitive bias occurs, that can result in severe and systematic decision distortions. Setting the hurdle rate might be such a complex decision task. The following example will illustrate where subjective judgement represented by a heuristic is involved in setting the hurdle rate. It will be shown how a heuristic might influence a manager's judgement and the bias that can result.
Example
Consider a situation where a decision-maker such as a manager or a CFO of a large 6 company, who is responsible for making capital investment decisions, has data about previous investment 5 For a discussion on the extent to which heuristics are deliberate or unconscious processes, see for example Sloman (2002). 6 Decision-makers in large companies might have a more significant level of experience due to high investment volume, a high number of projects and standardised processes. Moreover, there can be more than one manager deciding on projects (e.g. each one responsible for another field) so that the "knowledge pool" and feedback to investments might be greater and better. § The external environment changed more than was anticipated; thus the business risk was not adequately recognised.
In all of the above Category II issues, the hurdle rate applied is likely to be seen to have been inappropriate. For example, not recognising over-optimistic cash flows or not recognising potential changes in the market (external environment) represents an underestimation of risk.
The firm's policy and the decision-maker's motivation may now increase efforts that all
Category II reasons will be eliminated in a subsequent appraisal to improve decision-making.
Learning from, and adjusting to the inappropriate appraisal components will be central to a project review; and a flawed investment appraisal that led to project failure represents a salient event to the decision-maker.
To a different decision-maker it may not be obvious whether the project failure was a 'poor draw' from the correctly specified distribution (Category I) of the project's outcomes, or whether there was a cash flow error or a risk was inadequately recognised (Category II).
Conceivably, a decision-maker may realise that risk had been adequately recognised (Category I) and thus it was not their mistake and should not influence their future judgement. Despite this reservation, there may still be a high enough proportion of projects that are perceived to be in Category II for the retrievability bias to irrationally upwardly skew hurdle rates:
The bias arises if, due to the 'painful' experience of a project failure in general or of a false appraisal, the perceived risk and thus hurdle rates for the subsequent projects under consideration are set higher than appropriate and what the 'availability' rule of thumb suggests.
In other words, prior mistakes are overcompensated. The systematic setting of inappropriately high hurdle rates gives distorted estimates of projects' profitability and leads to underinvestment. The feedback to the decision-maker due to false project appraisal will be discussed in the next section.
Systematisation of scenarios, outcomes and feedback
Figure 2 systematises and graphically depicts the problem by identifying eight cases, their decision outcomes and interpretations by the decision-maker. In Cases A, B, F and H decision mistakes were not made because even with the appropriate hurdle rate, the decision (accept or reject project) would have been the same. Cases D and E represent appropriate risk assessments and settings of the hurdle rate and are therefore not considered further.
In Case A, the decision-maker has -based upon their risk assessment -set the hurdle rate too high but the project nevertheless is accepted and will not lead to a loss in company value,
i.e. with hindsight, it will be seen to be 'good'. This implies that the projected cash flows must have been sufficiently high to compensate the inappropriately high hurdle rate effect. Error does not result from the hurdle rate being set too high in this case. The same logic applies to Case F which was correctly accepted, due to strong positive cash flows, despite an underestimation of risk and an inappropriately low hurdle rate.
With regard to the feedback provided to the decision-maker we should now consider the investment decision-making process and its final step (see Stage 7 in Figure 1 ): the follow-up monitoring phase of a project and in particular of the cash flows and the risk assessment (targetactual comparison and resulting analyses) followed by feedback and learning. This stage is illustrated in the right column in Figure 2 . If a routine mechanism is established which ex post explicitly analyses projects that have been accepted (i.e. the cash flows and whether the risks were adequately considered and thus the reasons why a project may not have turned out as projected) then decision-makers will get feedback on projects that have been accepted, such as Cases A, D, F and G. The analysis will reveal that the cash flows had been estimated too high, too low or appropriately and what risks were considered adequately or not and why (cf.
Category II). In doing so, a false appraisal of the hurdle rate in Cases A and F will become evident (green feedback fields). However, the decision-maker is unlikely to perceive the nonappropriate risk assessment and hurdle rate as significant because the decision would not have been altered using the 'correct' rate.
Figure 2 Decision-maker's perception of the setting of the hurdle rate (HR)
When evaluating a similar project next time, this analysis with its insights on the (inappropriate) risk assessment and thus setting of the hurdle rate (should and) probably will be taken into account by the decision-maker. The bottom arrow of Figure 2 represents learning about one's ability and updating one's prior idea about the appropriate risk and hurdle rate when new information arrives (see Gervais, 2010) . New information comes particularly from post audit feedback on projects that get adopted (A, D, F and G); this will affect the decisionmaker's subsequent estimates of the most appropriate hurdle rates. We note that the feedback that managers get can be of low quality as it is imprecise and slow, and investment decisions are made infrequently and irregularly, which complicates learning (Gervais, 2010) . Knight (1921) cautions that "in business management no two instances, perhaps, are ever very closely alike, in any objective, describable sense." However, we can assume that experienced decision-makers have capacity to integrate new information and compare it to previous situations so that learning does happen. A formal or an informal post audit of projects may provide information about the mistakes in the appraisal; realising that the initial risk assessment was insufficient may happen consciously but, more importantly, also unconsciously.
As indicated above, the essential point is that the feedback on some investment decisions, such as G, which 'go wrong' might be more salient and vivid than on others such as A and F which turn out as successes; this is elaborated in the following paragraphs.
With regard to Case B (H): The project's risk is not adequately recognised and may be underestimated (overestimated); thus the hurdle rate is set too high (low) and the project is rejected due to a negative NPV, but the erroneous rate is not obvious; the decision-maker will not be aware of the false setting of the rate, because companies seldom organise follow-up monitoring on projects that have been rejected. The decision-maker is thus not in a position to use this information when assessing the next project. Furthermore, even if ex post reviews were carried out on B and H, they would show that despite the inappropriate hurdle rates the appraisal outcomes were, in fact, the right ones.
Our model contains two scenarios for incorrect accept-reject decisions: First, a false positive case can be illustrated by the fire example in Section 2.2, is represented by Case G in Figure 2 . The project was not rejected but with an appropriate rate it would have been rejected.
The hurdle rate was set too low, which resulted in insufficient discounting of future cash flows.
This can result in accepting a project which is later seen to generate a negative NPV. The poor decision evidenced by a poor outcome is likely to be a salient event (red feedback field in Figure 2 ) and can generate the previously described retrievability bias and an incorrectly raised hurdle rate in future appraisals.
Secondly, a false negative case is given in Case C of Figure 2 . The project risk is overestimated, the hurdle rate therefore set too high, and the project is rejected due to a negative estimated NPV. With an appropriate (lower) hurdle rate, the appraisal would have correctly shown a positive NPV for the proposed project and the project might have turned out to be successful ex post. However, the decision-maker will not realise the false decision because the project will not be undertaken. The decision-maker is unlikely to get feedback on the mistaken risk assessment and having set the hurdle rate too high and so does not learn from the
